摘要
集成商在物流服务供应链中通过激励机制对服务提供商进行物流能力集成时,如果忽略了客户对服务质量的评价作用会影响激励效果。本文利用委托-代理理论,在考虑物流服务供应链激励机制设计中存在的双向道德风险、多代理人问题的基础上,研究客户对服务质量的评价对物流服务供应链中激励效果的影响。研究结果表明加入客户对服务质量的评价后的激励机制与之前相比,集成商努力程度降低,转移支付及固定成本升高,服务提供商的努力水平则依赖于成本分摊比例及额外成本转化系数的具体情况。
In logistics service supply chain, service integrator ignores the fact that customer′s evaluation of service quali-ty will affect the incentive effect when integrating service providers′logistics capabilities through the incentive mecha-nism.On the basis of considering the double-side moral hazard and multi-agent problems that exists in logistics serv-ice supply chain′s incentive mechanism design, this paper studies the impact of customer′s evaluation of service quality on the incentive effect in logistics service supply chain with principal -agent theory.The results show that after consid-ering the customer′s evaluation of service quality in incentive mechanism, the level of integrator′s effort is lower than be-fore, but the transfer payments and fixed costs are both higher.Service providers′effort level is dependent on specific circumstances of the cost-sharing ratio and the additional cost conversion coefficients.
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第1期166-174,共9页
Commercial Research
关键词
物流服务供应链
激励机制
服务质量评价
双向道德风险
多代理人
logistics service supply chain
incentive mechanism
evaluation of service quality
double-sided moral hazards
multi-agents
