摘要
从信息不对称角度出发,运用委托代理理论研究了物流服务供应链中物流服务集成商和物流服务供应商之间的利益博弈问题,重点分析了信息不对称条件下物流服务集成商和物流服务供应商的委托代理问题和最优报酬激励选择问题,通过模型求解分析了报酬激励强度和努力成本、物流服务能力、不确定环境变量以及风险规避度等之间的相关关系,在此基础上提出了建立最优激励合同的政策建议,对物流服务供应链的形成和发展有一定指导作用。
In this paper, from the angle of information asymmetry, we used the principal-agent theory to study the game problem with logistics service integrator and logistics service providers in the logistics service supply chain, analyzed emphatically the principal-agent problem and optimal motivation problem of the two with asymmetric information and through solving the model discussed the interrelationship between intensity of motivation, effort cost, logistics service capacity, unce^ain environmental variable and risk aversion, etc., on the basis of which we proposed the suggestions to build the optimal motivation contract.
出处
《物流技术》
北大核心
2013年第7期363-365,共3页
Logistics Technology
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(09YJC630247)
重庆理工大学青年基金资助项目(2010ZD10)
关键词
物流服务供应链
不对称信息
委托代理
激励机制
logistics service supply chain
asymmetric information
principal-agent
motivational mechanism
