摘要
为探寻制造商质量投资决策对促进供应链成员间信任关系的作用,从参与人的有限理性出发,构建了制造商质量投资决策与零售商信任关系的演化博弈模型。结果表明:单群体演化模型中,制造商质量投资成本与零售商对制造商的转移支付直接影响演化结果,系统的演化敏感地依赖于制造商群体和零售商群体的初始状态;两群体模型中不存在演化稳定策略,在一定条件下,系统的演化呈现周期性的特征。
In order to investigate the effect of manufacturer＇s quality investment on promoting supply chain members＇ trust,this paper presents an evolutionary game model of the manufacturer＇s investment decision and the retailer＇s trust based on the players＇ bounded rationality. In the model of one population,it is shown that the manufacturer＇s investment costs and the retailer＇s transfer payments significantly affect the equilibria. Furthermore,evolution of the system depends on the initial state of the manufacturers and retailers population. There is no evloutionary stable strategy in the model of two populations and the evolutionary direction exhibits cyclical characteristics under certain conditions.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第12期95-98,共4页
Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71071075
71173103)
国家社会科学基金重大项目(12&ZD204)
教育部人文社会科学规划项目(12YJC630180)
关键词
供应链
质量投资
信任关系
演化博弈
supply chain
quality investment
trust relationship
evolutionary game
