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弱势零售商-强势第三方电子商务平台经营博弈研究 被引量:6

Vulnerable Retailers:A Study on the Operational Game of a Strong Third-Party E-Commerce Platform
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摘要 结合电子商务时代背景将传统供应链博弈模型进行了拓展,把第三方电子商务平台作为博弈一方,并考虑全量折扣影响和商品推广投入,对由一个弱势零售商和一个强势第三方电子商务平台组成的供应链在两种不同模式下商品定价、商品推广投入、需求、电商平台佣金比例和收益进行了探究.其中,在Stackelberg博弈中将强势的第三方电子商务平台设定为领导者,在合作博弈中对结果进行了Pareto改进.最后,通过数值算例模拟发现合作总是能给整个供应链带来更大收益,同时商品价格和推广费用较非合作均有所降低,需求和双方收益在一定条件下均有所增加,使零售商、电商平台和消费者取得"三赢". Based on the background of e-commerce,this paper expands the traditional supply chain game model.Considering the full discount impact and commodity promotion investment,the supply chain consists of a weak retailer and a strong third-party e-commerce platform where commodity pricing,commodity promotion investment,commodity demand,e-commerce platform commission ratio and the proceeds are explored in two different modes.In the Stackelberg game,a strong third-party e-commerce platform is set as the leader,and the results are improved by Pareto in the cooperative game.Finally,through numerical examples,it is found that cooperation can always bring more benefits to the entire supply chain.At the same time,commodity prices and promotion costs are lower than non-cooperation,and both demand and benefits of each parties are increased under certain conditions.Retailers,e-commerce platforms and consumers will achieve "three wins".
作者 刘妍 刘隽 古天龙 LIU Yan;LIU Jun;GU Tian-long(Business School,Guilin University of Electronic Technology,Guilin 541004,China)
出处 《数学的实践与认识》 北大核心 2019年第20期89-97,共9页 Mathematics in Practice and Theory
关键词 零售商 第三方电子商务平台 合作博弈 STACKELBERG博弈 retailer third-party e-commerce platform cooperative game Stackelberg game
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