摘要
考虑政府采购部门以多阶段多属性逆向拍卖的形式将研发合约外包或采购某种需要研发的创新性产品。在每一阶段投标者的R&D投入实现后,技术或产品的质量水平以一定的概率得以提高,采购方通过多属性拍卖来确定本阶段采购合同的获得者。投标者面临的问题是如何确定R&D投入以最大化自己的累计净收益。构建一个随机动态博弈模型来研究多阶段多属性拍卖中投标者的策略,提供一个随机算法来发现随该机动态博弈的近似马尔科夫完美均衡,即投标者的最优R&D投入策略。
The paper studies a multi -stage multi -attribute reverse auction of R＆amp;D contracts or innovative products in government procurement.After R＆amp;D input is realized,the quality of potential bidders can be improved according to some probability.The winner of the contract in every stage is determined through a multi-attribute auction.The problem of the bidder is to determine the amount of R＆amp;D input to maximize his expected discounted value of future net cash flow.A sto-chastic dynamic game model is set up to analyze the strategy of the bidders and a stochastic algorithm is presented to find out Markov perfect equilibrium of the game.
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第15期215-218,共4页
Science and Technology Management Research
基金
教育部人文社科基金青年项目"政府研发合同的多属性拍卖机制研究"(09YJC630208)
关键词
多属性拍卖
随机动态博弈
马尔科夫完美均衡
随机算法
multi-attribute auction
stochastic dynamic game
Markov perfect equilibrium
stochastic algorithm
