摘要
目标公司会计信息质量影响收购公司绩效吗？流动性假设认为，目标公司会计信息质量越高，收购公司的支付价格越高，并购绩效越差；管理者代理假设认为，目标公司会计信息质量越高，收购公司股东对并购协同效应和支付价格的估计越准确，有利于抑制自利或自大管理者的机会主义并购行为，从而产生高的并购绩效。本文以2003～2007年上市公司并购事件为样本，对上述两大假设进行了实证检验。结果发现，目标公司会计信息质量对民营收购公司的短期市场绩效和长期会计绩效均有显著的正的影响，从而支持了管理者代理假设占主导的观点，而这些效应在国有并购样本中不成立。本文的研究结果意味着，监管部门应该强化企业的会计信息质量，这不仅有利于本企业的资源配置效率，还有利于其他潜在收购企业的资源配置效率。
Does target firm＇s accounting information quality affect acquirer returns？ The liquidity theory arguesthat higher - quality accounting information leads to higher acquiring price, and thus lower acquirer returns.However, the agency theory argues that higher- quality accounting information leads to accurate assessment onthe merger synergies and acquiring price for the acquirer＇s shareholders, where the opportunity mergers resultedby selfish or hubris managers are more likely to be prevented, and thus leads to higher acquirer returns. Usinga large sample of acquisitions of China from 2003 to 2007, we find that higher - quality accounting informationis positively related to both announcement abnormal returns and long - run accounting performance of private acquirers, consistent with the agency theory, while these effects do not hold in the state sample. These resultssuggest that the regulator should enhance the criterion of firm accounting information, which can improve boththe firm＇s and the potential acquirer＇s capital allocation efficiency.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第7期140-153,共14页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:71172205
71272229和71372126)
教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(项目批准号:10JZD0019)
关键词
目标公司会计信息质量
并购绩效
流动性假设
管理者代理假设
产权性质
Target firm＇s accounting information quality, Acquirer returns, Liquidity theory, Agency theory,Acquirer ownership
