摘要
限定一个连续对策不是平凡地无意义 (例如对某个局中人绝对有利等 ) ,我们提出了连续对策上的计策的基本概念。最后得到结论 :如果局中人 1使用经典对策 ,那么他的赢得期望必不是赢得函数的最大值。如果局中人 1使用计策成功 (即使得局中人 2中计 ) ,那么局中人 1必取得赢得函数的最大值。局中人
Assuming that a continuous game is significant,eg.when it is absolutely favorable for one of the two players, we give some basic concepts of tricks on a continuous game. We draw the conclusion: If a player 1 uses the classical game, then his winning expectation is not equal to the greatest value of the winning function. If the player 1 successfully uses a trick,that is, the player 2 is trapped, then the player 1's winning is the greatest value of the winning function. We also have a dual result about the player 2.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSCD
2002年第2期41-46,共6页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目 (78970 0 2 5 )
关键词
连续对策
实质性
计策
佯策
隐蔽策略
中计
识破计策
continuous game
essential game
trick
shame strategy
concealed strategy
trapped
see through a trick
