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一类双行动对称三人博弈的局势分析法 被引量:4

Situation analysis method of a double action symmetrical 3-person game
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摘要 研究了一类三人双行动对称博弈的局势预测问题与指导参与人达到共赢问题.基于偏爱信息熵极小的局势概率分布是参与人共同知识的假定,得到了此类博弈中信息熵极小的局势概率分布的计算公式,并由一个算例说明了此类博弈的局势分析法的应用,结果表明由本文所得分析结论与直观吻合,具有精确性,客观性和可操作性. In order to research the problems about forecasting situations and controlling situation such that all the players win in double action symmetrical 3-person games, a formula of computing probability distribution of situations with minimal entropy in the games is obtained based on the assumption that it is all the players' common knowledge that every player prefers probability distribution of situations with minimal entropy. A situation analysis method about the games is given by an example. The example shows that the conclusion obtained by the method is consistent with the intuitive, and has accuracy, objectivity and operability.
作者 姜殿玉
出处 《系统工程学报》 CSCD 北大核心 2011年第5期608-613,共6页 Journal of Systems Engineering
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871051)
关键词 双行动三人博弈 对称性 可边际相关均衡 最优局势分布 局势分析 double action 3-person game symmetry marginal-able correlated equilibrium optimal situation distribution situation analysis
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参考文献15

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