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农业企业总经理变更与经营绩效的相关性分析——基于中国上市公司的实证研究 被引量:1

Correlation Between General Manager Turnover and Firm Performance in Agricultural Companies——An Empirical Study on Chinese Listed Companies
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摘要 高管变更是一个有效的公司控制机制。当企业的经营绩效下降时,董事会便有可能更换现任的高管。对中国农业上市企业总经理变更样本进行的实证研究表明,企业的经营绩效可以在相当大的程度上解释总经理变更的可能性。然而,与董事会初衷不一致的是,总经理变更后企业的经营绩效并没有得到明显改善。因此,农业企业董事会在变更总经理的决策过程中需要非常谨慎,尤其是过度或者频繁变更总经理会给企业带来诸多不良影响。 General manager turnover is an effective control mechanism in companies.When the firm per- formanee declines ,the board of directors may replace the current executives.The empirical study on a sample of general manager turnover of Chinese agricultural listed companies has showed that,to a great extent, firm performance can explain the likelihood of general manager turnover.However, finn performance has not significantly improved after replacing general managers, and this is inconsistent with the original intention of the board. Therefore,the board of agricultural companies should be very cautious when they are making decisions to replace the general manager.Replacing general managers too often, in particular, will bring many had effects to companies.
出处 《农林经济管理学报》 CSSCI 2014年第3期299-305,共7页 Journal of Agro-Forestry Economics and Management
基金 国家社会科学基金项目(09BJL032) 广东省自然科学基金项目(10151064201000047) 广东省高等学校高层次人才项目(粤财教[2013]246号) 广东省"211工程"三期建设项目(2011211YB01) 广州市哲学社会科学基金项目(2014-WY01 13Y28)
关键词 总经理变更 农业企业 经营绩效 general manager turnover agricultural company firm performance
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参考文献15

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