摘要
经理股票期权这种激励机制对减少经营者的偷懒行为 ,改善企业的经营绩效有积极的作用。但如果没有有效的监控机制 ,这种激励机制的作用就会被扭曲。对经营者的监控需要足够的信息 ,有效的信息产生于充分的竞争。在公有产权为主体的情况下 ,充分信息的不可获得性和有效竞争的不可能性使有效监控成为不可能。所以 ,经理股票期权目前不仅无助于国有企业经营绩效的改善 。
Executive Stock Options(ESO) have the positive role not only in diminishing the shirking and opportunistic behaviors, but also in bettering the performance of enterprises. However, if there is no effective supervising mechanism resulting from the intense competition, this inspiring mechanism will be distorted. Under the condition of the domain of the state\|owned enterprises(SOEs), effective supervision becomes impossible because the sufficient information is not available and sufficient competition is impossible. Therefore, ESO can just worsen the performance of SOEs, and helps to open another channel for the state\|owned property loss.
出处
《大连理工大学学报（社会科学版）》
2000年第4期39-42,共4页
Journal of Dalian University of Technology(Social Sciences)
关键词
经理股票期权(ESO)
信息
监控
产权
Executive Stock Options(ESO)
information
supervision
property rights
