摘要
将数量折扣引入到具有随机等价互补品的序贯二价拍卖中,研究了数量折扣对买者均衡报价战略及期望剩余的影响,建立了卖者如何选择最优的数量折扣以最大化自己期望收益的规划问题.分析结果表明:采用适量的数量折扣可以激发买者之间的激烈竞争行为,进而使得卖者的期望收益得到提高,而最优的数量折扣随着买者人数的增加而减小.
Quantity discount is introduced into sequential second-price auctions with two stochastically equivalent complementary objects. We study the impact of quantity discount on the buyers＇ equilibrium bidding strategies and expected surplus, set up the programming problem for the seller to choose the optimal quantity discount in order to maximize her ex ante expected revenue. Our analysis shows that： adopting quantity discount induces intense competition among the bidders, adequate quantity discount can increase the seller＇s ex ante expected revenue and optimal quantity discount decreases as the number of bidders increases.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2014年第5期1196-1201,共6页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金(71071119)
国家自然科学基金重点项目(71231007)
关键词
序贯拍卖
数量折扣
机制设计
二层规划
sequential auctions
quantity discount
mechanism design
bi-level programming
