摘要
中国排污权交易市场尚不完善,若初始排污权的分配结果与现有排污量差异过大,排污方不能及时调整生产方式或结构与之相适应,同时又无法顺利在市场上购买到所必须的排污权量,排污方的经济社会发展将会受到阻碍。基于此,提出了总量控制下流域初始排污权的竞争性混合分配方式:一部分排污权按照现状排污比例进行分配,另一部分排污权实行竞争性分配。重点研究了排污权的竞争性分配决策:提出了由排污管理者制定柔性决策参数,排污方在柔性参数约束下进行自主竞争的初始排污权配置机制;建立了总量控制下初始排污权分配的竞争性决策模型,模拟排污方在排污管理者的总体控制下以"自身排污配比最大化"为目标通过交互评价的方式参与初始排污权的分配过程。柔性决策参数的构建反映了排污权管理者对初始排污权分配的公平性、高效性原则的整体把握;排污方在柔性权重下以"自评"和"它评"为主要形式进行交叉评价,体现了排污方在排污权分配中的"发言权"和"参与权";排污权管理者对排污方交叉评价结果的集结,实质上是对排污方之间的"利益"进行协调。在初始排污权的竞争性混合分配方式中,竞争性分配的排污权比例取决于流域内排污方的经济社会发展对排污量变化的"敏感度",排污方经济社会发展对排污量变化的"敏感度"越高,竞争性分配的比例的取值宜越小,反之越大。同时,可根据排污交易市场的建设进度,逐步提高竞争性分配排污权的比例,分阶段实现流域排污权的动态分配,最终达到对排污权进行高效、公平分配的目标。以北江流域为例进行了分析,给出了排污权分配总量中竞争性分配比例取不同值时,北江流域6个城市排污权分配的动态结果。
With the incomplete emissions trading market in China, if the difference between the initial emission rights allocation results and existing current emission conditions is too large, the polluters can＇ t adjust the social production mode or structure timely, and the market can＇ t supply with the necessary emission rights, the economic and social development will be impeded. Based on this, competitive mixed model of emissions allocation is proposed： a part of emission rights distribution is in accordance with the current ratio, and another part is distributed competitively. Competitive allocation decision methods is focus on： Initial emission rights allocation mechanism is proposed that emission regions compete on allocation proportion independently with flexible decision parameters given by emission manager departments, and then competitive decision model of initial emission rights under total quantity control is put forward. It is simulated in the model that polluters participate in the emission rights allocation decision process equally taking ＇ self discharge ratio maximization＇ as goal under the overall control by emission managers. Uncertain decision parameters reflect fairness, efficiency principles grasped by emission rights managers. Cross evaluation among the polluters by evaluating self and others reflects the polluters＇ ＇ voice＇ and ＇ participation rights＇ in the process of emission rights allocation decision ; polluters＇ cross evaluation results aggregation by emission rights managers is essentially the coordination of polluters＇ ＇ interests＇. In the competitive mixed initial emissions allocation method, the ratio of competitive allocation depends on the economic and social development＇ s sensitivity degree to emissions. When the sensitivity degree is large, the value of competitive allocation ratio should be small. Otherwise the competitive allocation ratio should be large. At the same time, according to the emission trading market construction progress, competitive al
出处
《中国人口·资源与环境》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第5期88-92,共5页
China Population,Resources and Environment
基金
国家自然科学基金"基于灰数信息的决策模型及其在黄河冰凌灾害风险管理中的应用研究"(编号:71271086)
华北水利水电学院高层次人才科研启动项目"不确定环境下的自主式灰色关联评价方法研究"(2011)
华北水利水电大学管理科学与工程省级重点学科建设项目
关键词
初始排污权分配
竞争性决策
总量控制
initial emission rights allocation
competitive decision
total quantity control
