摘要
政府—医院管理层—医务人员之间存在的双层委托代理关系,不仅意味着代理链条延长带来的治理困难,而且在每层委托代理中,代理人都面临多任务,使公益性任务的目标出现两次异化。文章首次将双层多任务委托代理模型引入公立医院公益性问题的分析之中,在借鉴Holmstrom和Milgrom的多任务委托代理模型的基础上,提出了解决两层委托代理关系中多任务委托代理问题的建议。
The principal-agent relationship exists among the government, the hospital management and the medical staff. It not only means that the agent chain extended the governance difficulties, but also in every layer of principal- agent, agents are facing multiple tasks, which makes the public welfare goal be deviated. The paper for the first time puts forward a double layer multi-task principal-agent model to the public welfare problem analysis of public hospitals. The solution in the two layer multi task principal-agent problems is proposed based on Holmstrom and Milgrom＇s multi task principal agent model.
出处
《中国医院管理》
2014年第4期21-23,共3页
Chinese Hospital Management
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(11YJA790210)
关键词
多任务委托代理模型
公立医院
公益性
激励
multitask principal-agent model, public hospital, public welfare, incentive
