摘要
城市交通群体性事件多发,严重影响着城市公众的生产、生活和城市的安全。文章基于博弈论、情绪感染理论的方法论,剖析了出租车司机、出租车公司、出租车政府职能管理部门的博弈过程。城市交通群体性事件的深层次原因是利益诉求机制不畅通,城市地方政府在交通群体性事件的应对意识和能力还存在明显不足。因此,完善利益诉求型城市交通群体性事件的处置机制,化解冲突,应完善利益诉求与表达制度、畅通信息传递渠道、建立规范的劳动关系、强化政府的服务职能、健全出租车司机的行业组织。
Mass disturbances in the field of city traffic happened more frequently, it brings bad influence on the city＇ s production, life and safety. Mainly based on game theory, emotional contagion, taking Chongqing 11.3 taxi strike as an example, the thesis analyzes game process of taxi driver, taxi companies, government. It shows that deep-seated reasons are interests mechanism which is not smooth. We found that city governments are obviously insufficient in the awareness and ability of responding to the mass disturbances of city traffic. Therefore, In order to solve the problem, we should to improve interests appeals and expression system, flow information channels, build regulatory labor relations, strengthen government＇ service function, perfect industry organization of taxi driver.
出处
《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第2期1-7,共7页
Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)
基金
重庆市宣传文化人才资助项目(渝委宣办〔2012〕24号)
关键词
群体性事件
城市交通
社会组织
博弈论
urban traffic
mass disturbances
social organization
game theory
