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中国农村环境关系失衡的博弈分析 被引量:5

Using Game Theory to analyze rural environment relation imbalance of China
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摘要 环境关系是环境主体间的利益关系,环境侵权的发生是环境关系失衡的主要表现,中国农村环境污染态势加剧主要根源于中国农村环境关系失衡。环境污染的过程就是环境主体间的博弈过程,中国农村环境主体间的博弈具有很多特点,分析中国农村环境侵权发生的微观机理,可以比较准确地把握中国农村环境关系失衡的本质。要改善中国农村环境污染状况,就必须改善中国农村居民在博弈过程中的微弱地位,形成良性的环境关系制衡机制,从而使中国农村环境关系从失衡走向和谐。 The environmental relations are benefit relations between the environmental social main bodies, the occurrence of the environmental right infringement is main manifestation of the unbalanced environmental relations. The progress of environmental pollution is a game process between environmental main bodies. There are many characteristics of the game between environmental main bodies in China' s countryside, as a result, the analysis of micro-mechanism of China' s rural environmental infringement can accurately master the essence of China' s rural environmental imbalance. The conclusion is that, in order to change the environmental pollution conditions in China's countryside, the weak status of China' s rural inhabitants in the gaming process must be changed to form a benign restriction mechanism of environmental relations so that China' s rural environmental relations can develop from imbalance to harmony.
作者 周纪昌
机构地区 中原工学院
出处 《重庆工商大学学报(西部论坛)》 2007年第6期63-67,共5页 Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University:West Forum
基金 国家社科规划项目(06DJL032)"构建人与自然和谐发展的制度体系研究" 河南省社科规划项目(2005FJJ036)"人与自然和谐发展的综合决策体系研究"
关键词 环境关系 环境社会主体 环境污染 农村 博弈论 environmental relations environmental social main body environmental polluted countryside Game Theory
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