摘要
属人的良品——无论是道德良品还是非道德良品——都成于(常识性)实践(即可通过〔常识性〕实践培养生成),且不可教授(即不可以知识的形式加以教授)。"成于实践"和"不可教授"可看作是属人的良品的两项基本特征,也可视作是衡量或判断人所内在拥有的某种东西是否成其为良品的两项必要(但非充分)条件或基本标准。凡不成于实践,或可以教授的东西一定不成其为属人的良品。从这种观点看,亚里士多德视野中的自然良品因为不成于实践就不成其为属人的良品,休谟理解的自然良品则应解释为实践(性)良品。此外,技艺虽然也成于常识性实践,但因为可以教授,从而不成其为属人的良品。实际上,技艺的培养恰恰有赖于良品。在这个意义上说,良品比技艺更为根本。再者,亚里士多德把理智良品理解为主要成于教导也是不妥当的。其实,理智良品作为属人的良品之重要一类,不仅成于实践,而且其种也远不仅限于亚里士多德视野中的那几种。
Personal virtues, moral or non-moral, are all developed by （commonsense）practice （that is, cultivated via. [commonsense]practice） ,and unteachable （being not able to be taught in form of knowledge）. ＂Developed-by-practice＂and ＂unteachable＂can be regarded not only as two basic attributes of personal virtue, but also as two necessary （but not suffi- cient）conditions or criteria to measure or judge whether what a person possesses is intrinsically virtue. What is not developed by practice,or what is teachable, must not be personal virtue. Accordingly, the natural virtue in Aristotle＇s vision cannot be regarded as personal virtue for its not being developed by practice, and the natural virtue in Hume＇s understanding should be interpreted as practical virtue. Moreover, art, developed by commonsense practice though, is not personal virtue for being teachable. In fact,the development of art depends on virtue. Therefore, virtue is of more fundamentality than art. Further- more,it is not suitable for Aristotle to explain intellectual virtue as developed mainly by teaching. In fact, as an important kind, intellectual virtue is developed by practice, and its species include far more than what Aristotle has listed.
出处
《北京师范大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第2期90-101,共12页
Journal of Beijing Normal University(Social Sciences)
