期刊文献+

股权结构对创业板上市公司R&D投资的影响 被引量:3

The Effect of Ownership Structure on R&D Investment:Evidence from Listed Companies on the ChiNext
下载PDF
导出
摘要 本文以2010年底前在创业板上市的公司为研究对象,手工收集这些公司2010年至2012年研发投资数据,考察实际控制人持股、机构投资者持股对企业研发投资的影响。研究发现:我国创业板上市公司R&D投资与控股股东持股比例呈现出先下降再缓慢上升的"U型"关系,机构投资者持股比例与企业的研发投资显著正相关。研发投资具有风险大、周期长的特点,本文的研究结论说明,由于存在控股股东与中小股东之间的代理冲突,控股股东追求短期回报会降低企业的研发投资,另一方面,发挥机构投资者对控股股东的制衡作用对企业研发投资具有积极的促进作用。 Using a sample of companies which IPO before 2010 on the ChiNext Stock Market between 2010 and 2012,this paper analyzes the effect of ownership structure on R&D investment.We find that the relation between R&D investment and the equity of de facto controller is U-shape,and we also find that the shareholding of institu-tional investors have a positive effects on R&D investment.The R&D have its own features such as high cost,high risk and long cycle.Our findings support the agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders.An initial offering allows controlling shareholder a chance to cash out,and for this reason,decreases their long-term R&D in-vestments motives.Along with an increasing of equity proportion for the institutional shareholder,it can acts as a counter balance to majority shareholders,thus improving the R&D investment of the corporate.
作者 张粟 令媛媛
出处 《华南理工大学学报(社会科学版)》 2014年第1期27-35,共9页 Journal of South China University of Technology(Social Science Edition)
关键词 股权结构 R&D投资 代理冲突 创业板 ownership structure R&D investment agency conflict ChiNext
  • 相关文献

参考文献17

  • 1Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, Ownership and Market Valuation: Robert W. Vishny. Management an Empirical Analysis [J]. Jour-hal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20:293 - 315. 被引量:1
  • 2吴中超,杜金沛.企业持续成长动因与机理:自持续竞争力观察[J].改革,2011(7):122-129. 被引量:3
  • 3Adolf A. Berle, Gardiner C. Means. The Modern Corporation and Private Property IMP. New York : Maemillan, 1932:45-73. 被引量:1
  • 4Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny. Management Entrench- ment: The Case of Managerial Specific Investments [ J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1989, 25 : 123 - 139. 被引量:1
  • 5Michael C. Jensen, William H. Meckling. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3:305 -360. 被引量:1
  • 6Charles W. L. Hill, Scott A. Snell. External Control, Corpo- rate Strategy, and Firm Performance in Research - Intensive In- dustries [J]. Strategic Management Journal, 1988, 9: 577- 590. 被引量:1
  • 7Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan, Larry H. P. Lang. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings [ J l, Journal of Finance, 2002, 57: 1031 - 1069. 被引量:1
  • 8Guochang Zhang. Ownership Concentration, Risk Aversion and the Effect of Financial Structure on Investment Decisions [ J ] , European Economic Review, 1998, 42:1751 - 1778. 被引量:1
  • 9Jennifer Francis, Abbie Smith Agency Costs and Innovation:Some Empirical Evidence [ J]. Journal of Accounting and Eco- nomics, 1995, 19 (2-3): 383-409. 被引量:1
  • 10杨建君,盛锁.股权结构对企业技术创新投入影响的实证研究[J].科学学研究,2007,25(4):787-792. 被引量:84

二级参考文献142

共引文献427

同被引文献24

引证文献3

二级引证文献6

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部