摘要
构建一个多物品共同价值拍卖模型,分析竞标人决定其信息搜集强度的准则,比较统一价格拍卖、歧视性拍卖和广义VCG拍卖的信息产生能力和竞标人投标行为,得到机制的定价效率和卖者收益的排序。在理论模型的基础上设计3组实验,对比不同的多物品共同价值拍卖机制的信息搜集强度、定价准确性和市场反应情况。研究结果表明,拍卖的机制特征决定信息产生能力,信息产生能力和竞标行为决定定价效率和卖者收益;广义VCG拍卖的信息搜集强度最大、定价准确性最高、攫取竞标人信息租金的程度最高,并会降低需求缩减;歧视性拍卖和广义VCG拍卖的市场出清价与标的物共同价值较接近,统一价格拍卖机制中标的物分配最集中,广义VCG拍卖下卖者收益最高。从信息产生能力和定价效率看,广义VCG拍卖优于统一价格拍卖和歧视性拍卖。
A multi-unit common value auction model is built to analyze the principles which are followed by the bidders to decide their information collection strength .The model compares the information generation capability and bidding behaviors of uniform price auction , discrimination auction and general VCG auction , and we obtain orders of mechanisms′pricing efficiency and sell-ers′profits.Based on the theoretical model , three lab experiments are designed to compare the information collection strength , pricing accuracy and market reaction in different multi-unit common value auction mechanisms .The results show that：①infor-mation generation capability , which is determined by the auction mechanism feature , and bidding behaviors dominate pricing effi-ciency and sellers′profits;②General VCG auction has the highest information collection strength , pricing accuracy and the de-gree of seizing bidders′information rents and will decrease demand reduction;and③The market clearing prices in discrimination auction and general VCG auction are very close to the common values of the goods .In the uniform price auction , the goods allo-cation clusters the most efficiently .The sellers get most in general VCG auction .From the view of information generation capabil-ity and pricing efficiency , general VCG auction is better than the other two auctions .
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第1期120-130,共11页
Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(70972086
71172068
71132001)
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(10JJD630002)~~
关键词
多物品共同价值拍卖
统一价格拍卖
歧视性拍卖
广义VCG拍卖
信息产生
multi-unit common value auction
uniform price auction
discrimination auction
general VCG auction
information gen-eration
