摘要
研究了互补性物品的最优拍卖机制.基于Myerson的单物品拍卖设计思想,建立了对互补性拍卖品的机制设计模型,求解出了两类物品情形下的最优拍卖机制,并通过算例说明了此机制在实际中的运用.进一步地,将此最优机制与几种常见的拍卖机制进行比较,结果表明,对于互补性物品的拍卖,卖主采用此机制获得的期望收益最高,并且对物品的配置最有效.
This paper studies the optimal auction mechanism for complements. Based on the design idea of single-object auction of Myerson, this paper builds the model of designing auction mechanism for complements and by solving the model gains the optimal auction mechanism only for the case of two objects. Then, a simple numerical example is given to show the application of this mechanism in auction. Further, the optimal auction mechanism is compared with several familiar auction mechanisms. The results show that the expected income of the seller is highest and the resource allocation is also most efficient in the optimal auction mechanism.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第9期60-65,共6页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金(60574071)
关键词
拍卖机制
互补性
激励相容
配置有效
auction mechanism
complement
allocation efficiency
incentive compatibility
