摘要
面对控股股东攫取私有收益,中小股东往往表现出"理性冷漠"或者选择"用脚投票"卖出股票,而非积极监督。通过建立数理模型首先研究中小股东在约束控股股东自利行为上所起的作用;其次分析影响中小股东参与公司治理决策和监督控股股东意愿的因素,合理解释了现实中存在的中小股东对控股股东自利行为不采取积极监督的原因;最终提出政府相关部门应该从降低维权和监督成本等方面着手,努力营造激励中小股东维权和监督意愿的制度与法律环境的政策建议。
When controlling stockholders seize their private benefits, minority shareholders tend to be rational apathy or voting with their feet,that is, to sell their stocks, but not conduct active supervision. The paper constructs mathematical models to investigate the role that minority shareholders played on restricting controlling shareholders＇ self - serving action, and then analyzes the factors affecting minority shareholders＇ participation both in corporate governance and monitoring controlling shareholders. At last, the paper interprets the reason why minority shareholders do not conduct supervision actively on controlling shareholders＇ self - serving action. Relevant government authorities should take efforts to reduce the cost in safeguard their rights and interests for minority shareholders, and create a institutional and legal environment which encourages minority shareholders to protect their rights and supervise controlling stockholders＇ self- serving action.
出处
《经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第6期11-16,共6页
Economic Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"创始家族对上市公司价值影响机理研究"(项目编号:71072137)
教育部人文社科规划基金项目"家族控制权配置选择对上市公司价值影响机理研究"(项目编号:11YJA630171)
浙江省自然科学基金项目"家族企业关系型控制权配置
内部代理冲突及治理效率研究"(项目编号:Y13G020028)的资助
关键词
控股股东
私有收益
中小股东
理性冷漠
积极监督
Controlling Shareholders
Private Benefit
Minority Shareholders
Rational Silence
Active Supervision
