摘要
本文构建了基于我国当前情形下政府间纵向税收竞争对税收增长的影响模型,并以分税制改革以来我国省际面板数据为样本进行动态模型分析,研究了我国纵向税收竞争对税收增长的实际影响。理论研究表明,基于中央地方税收分享比例与地方收入获取行为规范程度两方面的政府间纵向税收竞争对税收增长存在影响。动态面板数据模型分析进一步论证了该结论,指出分税制改革后各省份税收分权指标对税收增长的初期影响为正,但正向影响在不断减弱并转变为负向影响。规范性指标从总体来看对税收增长呈现负向影响;分区域来看,中、西部地区规范性指标对税收增长主要呈现负向影响,而东部地区则主要呈现正向影响。基于此,本文得出结论认为,我国政府间纵向税收竞争程度变动对税收增长呈现正向影响,即提高纵向税收竞争程度将加速税收增长,降低纵向税收竞争程度将减缓税收增长。
Before 1994, the local government of China possessed a large number of financial resources while the central government only occupied a little. Under this background, the central government of China started to implement the Tax-share Reform. This reform readjusted the financial and administrative power relations between the central and local government. Undoubtedly, the decrease in the government revenue exerted an effect on the behavior of local government which began to focus on the extra-budgetary and extra-institutional revenue. Mean- while, for the sake of restraining these phenomena, the central government carried out a series of rules and regula- tions. This gradually resulted in the intensification of vertical tax competition between the central and local govern- ment. What＇ s more, it is obvious that China has experienced the stage of continuous rapid growth in the tax reve- nue since the Tax-share Reform in 1994. This paper attempts to find out whether the degree of intergovernmental vertical tax competition will influence the tax growth. If so, what the current condition is in China. Based on the current situation in China, this paper establishes a model and introduces the equilibrium analysis method so as to analyze the impact of intergovernmental vertical tax competition on the tax growth. According to the study of Edwards ＆ Keen （1996） and Keen ＆ Kotsogiannis （2002）, this paper introduces a quasi-linear utility function to describe the utility of the representative consumer. In order to simplify the analysis, the paper sets a hy- pothesis that there is only one local government in the economic entity. It is demonstrated that the impact of interg- overnmental vertical tax competition on the tax growth exists from the perspective of the tax-sharing proportion and the constraint degree of the local government behavior in pursuing the revenue. The impact can be divided into two parts： one is the effect of the tax-sharing proportion and the constraint degree on the tax growth respectivel
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第10期1-14,共14页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目"民生财政导向下的财政支出结构优化研究"(2011001)
中南财经政法大学研究生创新教育计划课题项目"我国税收超经济增长的原因及其影响的实证研究"(2012S0301)
关键词
纵向税收竞争
税收增长
均衡分析
动态面板数据
vertical tax competition
tax growth
equilibrium analysis
dynamic panel data
