摘要
基于双寡头Cournot竞争模型,分析生产性技术拥有企业在收益两部收费方式下是否授权提高产品质量的创新技术,并寻求最优的技术授权水平及其对社会福利的影响,得到令人惊讶的结论:只有当技术创新程度较低时,技术拥有企业才会进行技术授权;技术拥有企业所授权的技术并非最先进的技术,而是由技术创新程度决定;技术授权一旦发生,授权双方会形成合谋,减弱竞争,这将损害消费者利益和社会福利,违反反垄断法。
This paper analyzes the authorization of the innovative technology of improving the quality of products in the company attributed to productivity technology and searches the best level of technology licensing as well as the influence of social welfare through the model of Cournot, which obtained the surprising conclusion： when the technology innovation of company is reaching lower, this company will conduct the authorization. If technology licensing happened, it weakens the competition among the company, which will damage the interests of consumer and social welfare as well as break the antitrust rules.
出处
《兴义民族师范学院学报》
2013年第3期5-7,18,共4页
Journal of Minzu Normal University of Xingyi
关键词
收益两部收费技术授权
社会福利
反垄断
the innovative technology of improving the quality of products
the technology licensing of earnings charge
socialwelfare
antitrust
