摘要本文借鉴Brander and Spencer(1981)的思想,讨论了跨国公司在面对当地知识产权保护力度非常弱的情况下,在模仿者产品质量较差的情况下,跨国公司选择与其共存,而当模仿质量较好时,选择打击潜在模仿者;而当跨国公司面对许多潜在模仿者时,她将选择打击一部分潜在模仿者而与另一部分模仿者共存。就上述两种情况,本文为政府制定长吉图吸引外资的相关政策提供了一定的理论依据。
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