摘要
基于产出不确定和市场需求不确定,分析农产品的供应链协调问题。首先以期望收益最大化为目标建立Stackelberg博弈模型,然后从理论上证明集中决策下系统存在最优计划生产量,在分散无协调的情况下,证明了生产商的最优生产量和销售商的订购量之间存在函数关系,并且关于销售商的订货量是线性递增的,此时生产商和销售商存在唯一的纳什均衡,并且供应链整体的利润低于集中决策情况下供应链整体的利润。在分散有协调情况下,风险共享契约能够实现供应链的协调,最后用实例证明了所提理论的合理性。
In this paper, based on output uncertainty and market demand uncertainty, we analyzed the coordination of the agricultural produce supply chain. First with the expected maximum revenue as the objective, we established the Stackelberg game model, then proved theoretically that under centralized decision there existed an optimal planned production volume and that under distributed decision and with no coordination, the optimal production volume of the producer was in a function-based relationship with the order quantity of the sellers, the two were linearly and positively proportional, and under such event the two had only one Nash equilibrium status, and at the end we used an empirical case to demonstrate the reasonability of the theory proposed.
出处
《物流技术》
北大核心
2013年第7期381-384,共4页
Logistics Technology
关键词
供应链协调
随机产出
随机需求
风险共享契约
supply chain coordination
stochastic output
stochastic demand
risk sharing contract
