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Game Theory Analysis of Quality Control in Two-Echelon Supply Chain 被引量:2

Game Theory Analysis of Quality Control in Two-Echelon Supply Chain
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摘要 Game theories were used to study the problem which has one manufacturer and one supplier in this paper. of quality control in the two-echelon supply chain Firstly, a stackelberg game was introduced into the quality control of a two-echelon supply chain. In this general non-cooperative quality control game situation, the manufacturer acts as the leader, the optimal action policies were obtained for the manufacturer and the supplier. Then, a Nash bargaining model was used to analyze optimal action selection in the cooperative quality control game situation and to determine the profit segment between two supply chain members after collaboration. By comparison of two game equilibrium results above, it was found that the cooperative quality control game structure is superior to the general non-cooperative quality control game structure during the process of quality management in the two-echelon supply chain. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the conclusion of this paper. Game theories were used to study the problem of quality control in the two-echelon supply chain which has one manufacturer and one supplier in this paper. Firstly, a stackelberg game was introduced into the quality control of a two-echelon supply chain. In this general non-cooperative quality control game situation, the manufacturer acts as the leader, the optimal action policies were obtained for the manufacturer and the supplier. Then, a Nash bargaining model was used to analyze optimal action selection in the cooperative quality control game situation and to determine the profit segment between two supply chain members after collaboration. By comparison of two game equilibrium results above, it was found that the cooperative quality control game structure is superior to the general non-cooperative quality control game structure during the process of quality management in the two-echelon supply chain. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the conclusion of this paper.
出处 《Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong university(Science)》 EI 2013年第4期508-512,共5页 上海交通大学学报(英文版)
基金 the Social Sciences Youth Funded Project of Chinese Ministry of Education(No.10YJC630076)
关键词 supply chain quality control GAME 经济计划 经济计算 经济数学方法 经济研究方法
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