摘要
本文采用博弈论分析方法,研究了矿产资源生态补偿过程中,企业与政府、公众与企业和政府共谋之间的合作博弈关系。通过构建博弈模型求均衡解,结果表明:①企业的生态补偿积极性受生态补偿成本、生态破坏惩罚力度、生态补偿收益等因素影响;政府的监管效果取决于监管成本、监管收益等因素;②公众是否参与取决于参与成本和收益;因共谋导致的企业声誉损失和政府政治成本及公众监督效果影响企业与政府的共谋。矿产资源生态补偿应以博弈均衡为基础,降低补偿成本,加强政府监管,强化公众的参与度,积极协调政府、企业和公众之间的利益关系,制定合理生态补偿政策,实现社会综合利益最大化。
This paper studies the game relationships between enterprise and government;among the public,enterprise and government in the process of ecological compensation of mineral resources.By constructing a game model for the equilibrium,the result indicates that：①ecological compensation costs,penalty,ecological compensation benefits are related to enterprise ecological compensation,the government＇s supervision costs,regulatory earnings influence government regulation＇s effect;② the cost of public participation influence public participation enthusiasm,enterprise reputation losses and government political cost caused by conspiracy and public participation effects have effects on the complicity of the enterprise and the government.Ecological compensation should be based on game equilibrium,and use function of the market mechanism,strengthens government regulation,and encourages the public participation,coordinates the relationship among government,enterprises and public interest,formulates reasonable ecological compensation policies,to realize social comprehensive benefit maximization.
出处
《中国矿业》
北大核心
2013年第8期40-43,共4页
China Mining Magazine
基金
黑龙江省自然科学基金项目"自愿性环境管理与企业价值关系--理论
实证与协同研究"资助(编号:G201131)
黑龙江省哲学社会科学研究规划项目"黑龙江省煤炭资源开发中的生态价值计量与补偿研究"资助(编号:12E037)
关键词
矿产资源
生态补偿
政府监管
博弈分析
mineral resources
ecological compensation
government regulation
game analysis
