摘要
利用2002至2010年我国A股上市公司相关数据,实证研究发现:对于备受市场关注的高管薪酬乱象,审计师发挥了一定的监督职能;相对于"天价薪酬",审计师对"零薪酬"的监督更为充分;相对于非国有上市公司,审计师对国有上市公司薪酬乱象的监督更为充分。研究结论表明:一方面,注册会计师关注了高管薪酬,审计准则得到了较好的履行;另一方面,注册会计师可能忽视了由"天价薪酬"所带来的重大错报风险。
Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2002 to 2010, this paper finds that auditors play a role in supervising executive pay chaos, to which more attention has been paid by cap- ital market＇s investors and regulators. Further study finds that auditor supervision on ＂zero salary＂ is more sufficient than on ＂astronomical salary＂, and the supervision on pay chaos is more sufficient in state-owned listed companies than in private-owned listed companies. It is concluded that on the one hand auditors have paid attention to executive pay, which means auditing standards are well enforced; on the other hand, au- ditors may ignore the risk of material misstatement caused by ＂astronomical salaries＂.
出处
《会计与经济研究》
北大核心
2013年第3期18-26,共9页
Accounting and Economics Research
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目(71132004)
关键词
高管薪酬
审计师
监督
executive compensation
auditor
supervision
