摘要
随着欧盟银行业一体化的持续深入，离散的欧盟银行监管①体系日益受到“三元悖论”的挑战，即高度一体化的金融体系无法在成员国保留银行监管权的前提下确保稳定。欧债危机（多爆发后，改革银行监管体系，以维护金融体系稳定在欧盟成为共识，欧盟银行监管理念与模式从“母国控制”原则转向“审慎监管”原则，成员国放弃银行监管权，极富创造性的欧盟银行新监管体系逐渐成形。
With the deepening of the EU banking integration process,the decentralised EU banking supervision system has increasingly met challenges from the ' Trilemma' that the stability of a highly integrated financial system cannot be guaranteed if the banking supervision authority is reserved in the hands of the member states.After the outbreak of European debt crisis,it has become a consensus in the EU that it is neces-sary to reform the bank supervision system in order to maintain the EU's financial stability.The idea and mode of the EU banking supervision has shifted from the 'home country control' principle to that of 'prudential supervision'.If the member states give up the banking supervision authority,the very creative new banking supervision system will finally come into truth.
出处
《欧洲研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第3期65-84,6-7,共20页
Chinese Journal of European Studies
