摘要
本文利用实地调查数据、运用条件价值评估法进行成本收益分析,对农村民主化治理与公共投资效率的关系进行实证研究发现,目前农村中选举程序的规范性对公共投资效率的影响不显著,而选举的竞争性与投资效率存在较为明显的倒U型关系,即适度竞争有利于保证公共投资的较高效率,过于激烈或几乎没有竞争的选举对投资效率会存在负向影响;上级政府指定项目施工方对投资效率有负面影响,而村民的参与在一定程度上有利于投资效率的提高。
Based on cross-section data from rural China,this paper exploits the relationship between grassroots democracy and the efficiency of public goods investment.Using data from 74 villages and 728 households,we have found that the normative degree of electoral procedure has no significant effects on the efficiency of public goods.In addition,the intensity of competition has an inverse-U-shape effect on the efficiency.We also found it has a negative effect on the efficiency if the government designated the construction side,while farmer participation factor has a positive effect.
出处
《农业经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第5期44-50,111,共7页
Issues in Agricultural Economy
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目"基于责任体系修复的乡村债务治理长效机制研究"
