摘要
本文以2006-2010年上市公司定向增发为研究样本,系统考察了大股东参与定向增发的动因及市场影响。实证结果表明:上市公司未来增长前景越好,大股东认购比例越高;市场对大股东参与定向增发的行为能够作出解读,对于大股东认购比例高的公司,市场正向反应越大。但定向增发这种歧视性的融资交易行为稀释了上市公司中小股东权益,侵害了公众投资者利益。本研究不仅有助于理解在股权集中之下不同利益主体的融资交易行为,还对未来市场的监管和市场有效投资决策提供了有益的思路。
Based on the sample in listed companies issuing private securities in China stock market from 2006 to 2010, this article examines controlling shareholders＇ behavior in the private placement and its market reaction. The result indicates that if controlling shareholders believe a higher profitability in the future, they will be willing to subscribe more stocks. The market can perceive information conveyed by controlling shareholders＇ behavior, and the stock price will react positively to firm a higher subscription rate. However, the private placement as a financial transaction is a kind of discrimination, which dilutes the minority shareholders＇ benefit, violating the public investors＇ interest. This study will not only help to understand the financing behavior of the different stakeholders under the ownership concentration, but also help to regulate the market and make the efficient investment decision in the future.
出处
《证券市场导报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第4期55-61,共7页
Securities Market Herald
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"投资者保护
定向增发和财富转移问题综合研究"(项目编号:10CGL040)
国家自然科学基金项目"我国企业集团内部资本市场的形成机制和经济后果研究"(项目编号:71172017)
上海市教委重点学科基金资助项目"会计学"(项目编号:J51701)
上海市教育委员会"教师专业发展工程"(2011年)的项目资助
关键词
定向增发
大股东
市场反应
财富转移
private placement, controlling shareholder, market reaction, transfer of wealth
