摘要
我国的新型农村金融机构主要包括村镇银行、小额贷款公司、农村资金互助社等。为明确政策激励与新型农村金融机构可持续发展关系,本文利用演化博弈理论构建了政府与新型农村金融机构可持续发展的动态演化博弈模型,模型分析结果表明政府策略的选择直接影响博弈结果,博弈双方投入成本的降低及收益的增加有利于促进新型农村金融机构的可持续发展。因此,为促进新型农村金融机构的可持续发展,政府应进一步采取一系列降低投资成本,提高投资收益的激励措施。
At present, the new types of rural financial institutions in China mainly include rural bank, microfinance companies, rural mutual cooperatives and etc. In order to make clear the relationship between the policy incentive and the sustainable development of new types of rural financial institutions, the dynamic evolutionary game model between the government and the investor of new types of rural financial institutions is established by using evolutionary game theory. The analysis results of the model show that： the strategy selection of the government directly affects the result of game, and the decrease of cost and the increase of income of both players can prompt the sustainable development of rural finan cial institutions. So, the government should further take a series of incentive measures to reduce the cost and increase the income of the sustainable development of rural financial institutions.
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第4期164-171,共8页
Commercial Research
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目
项目编号:11YJC790222
辽宁省社科联经济社会发展立项课题
项目编号:2012lslktzijjx-55
关键词
新型农村金融机构
演化博弈
激励策略
可持续发展
new types of rural financial institutions
evolutionary game
incentive strategy
sustainable development
