摘要
目前,中国债券市场上对公司债券发行的审批监管有发改委、证监会以及银行间市场交易商协会等多个部门,即存在着多头监管的问题,这种多头监管是否意味着低效率呢?本文以中国债券市场上发行的公司债券为研究样本,以债券市场发展中的重大事件为研究对象,试图对这一问题进行探讨。通过研究发现,监管部门的增加非但没有提高监管成本,反而降低了监管成本;同时,某一监管部门通过简化审批程序降低监管成本,也会导致其他监管部门同样采取降低监管成本的措施。研究结果表明,中国债券市场的多头监管并不完全意味着低效率监管,各监管部门之间还存在着一定程度的竞争关系。本文的研究结论能够为完善中国债券市场的监管政策提供一定的参考。
At present,Chinese bond market is facing the pro blem of regulatory fragmentation.Multiple departments including National Development and Reform Commission(NDRC),China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC),National Association of Financial Market Institutional Investors(NAFMII) jointly implement the examination and approval of corporate bond issue.Does regulatory fragmentation always lead to inefficient supervision? The article uses corporate bonds as research sample and uses important events during the development of Chinese bond market to study this question.According to our research,the increasing of the supervision departments does not increase the cost of monitor.On the contrast,it has decreased the supervision cost.If one department simplifies examination and approval procedures to reduce the supervision cost,other departments will follow.These results show that regulatory fragmentation of the bond market not lead to inefficient supervision.Supervision departments compete with each other,which will encourage them decreasing their supervision cost.The results of this paper can provide advices for the developments of Chinese bond market and the improvements in regulatory policy.
出处
《上海金融》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第2期54-59,117,共6页
Shanghai Finance
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(06BTY112)--资本市场发展中基础性制度建设研究的阶段性成果
关键词
公司债券
多头监管
监管成本
低效监管
部门竞争
Corporate Bond
Regulatory Fragmentation
Supervision Cost
Inefficient Regulation
Department Competition
