摘要
政治帮助会带给企业一个更高的收益,当然,企业也要为获取政治帮助付出成本,因此,企业会基于利润最大化的目的进行政治参与并获取政治帮助.那么,在进行政治参与的过程中,行业的市场集中度会对企业的政治参与程度产生什么样的影响呢?利用古诺模型对该问题进行了分析,并得到企业的政治参与程度会随着厂商数量的增加而降低的结论.利用美国行业的游说成本和市场集中度数据进行了经验研究,研究结果支持理论模型的结论.
This paper proposes that political help will bring enterprise a higher income,of course,the enterprise must pay for the political help to government,therefore,the enterprise will be based on the profit maximization purpose to do political participation and obtain political help.So,in the process of political participation,what kind market concentration will impact the political participation？ In this paper,we use a Cournot model to analyze this problem,and the conclusion is the higher market concentration the more political participation by enterprise.Then,we used the industry lobbying costs and market concentration data of United States to do an empirical research,and the results support the theory model conclusion.
出处
《渤海大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
2012年第4期376-380,共5页
Journal of Bohai University:Natural Science Edition
基金
辽宁省科学事业公益基金项目(No:GY2012-G-001)
关键词
市场集中度
政治参与
游说成本
market concentration
political participation
lobby cost
