摘要
本文讨论了生产成本函数形状、企业生产目标函数的变化对于国有经济或国有企业在产业乃至整个经济中的比重的影响。本文贡献了一个关于社会福利极大化目标在企业产量决策中的权数θ与产量水平q的两阶段古诺—纳什博弈的混合寡头模型 ,分析了在等边际成本与线性的市场需求反函数条件下 ,国有企业目标函数的变化与私有企业进入对于国有经济相对地位的效应 ,论证了在上述条件下国有经济在国民经济中的比重不会趋于零。
This article studies the impacts of changes in objective function of the State-Owned-Enterprises(SOEs) on the market share of SOEs in economy,given the shapes of cost functions.Two-step Cournot-Nash mixed oligopoly model is offered by this paper where the SOE and private firm compete for quantity.At the first stage,the SOE decides the weight of social welfare maximization in the objective function,whereas on the second stage she determines the optimal quantity.We have found out that,under constant marginal cost and linear reversed demand function,(i)reform of objective function of the SOEs is the necessary condition for entry of private firms,and (ii)the equilibrium share of the SOEs would converge to a point which is certainly above zero.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2000年第7期16-23,共8页
Economic Research Journal
