摘要
与讨论贝克莱反对物质实体的非物质主义的热烈场面相比,其心灵理论较少受到关注。贝克莱在其思想发展的早期阶段,曾一度持有一种休谟式的心灵理论,认为心灵不过是一簇知觉。但这种理论容易产生新的哲学困难,于是他放弃对心灵作知觉簇分析。在成熟时期的著作中,他将心灵描述为支撑观念的实体。通过实体论上的创新和"概念"学说的引入,他保持了其哲学体系的一致性,给出了在否定物质实体的同时可以保留精神实体的理由。
At one early stage of his development,Berkely held a Humean account of mind,according to which minds are nothing but congeries of perceptions.But later he abandoned the congeries account,because of its liability to new philosophical difficulties.Throughout his mature writings,Berkeley speaks of minds as substances that underlie or support ideas.He escapes the charge that it is inconsistent to retain spiritual substance while rejecting material substance by an innovation in the theory of substance and introducing a doctrine of notions into the knowledge of mind.
出处
《淮阴师范学院学报（哲学社会科学版）》
2012年第6期736-741,840,共6页
Journal of Huaiyin Teachers College(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
贝克莱
心灵
实体
概念
Berkeley
mind
substance
notion.
