摘要
面向中小企业的专利质押融资业务能够有效盘活无形资产,缓解中小企业资金压力。本文主要研究银行专利质押融资业务的核心风险控制指标——质押率决策。基于博弈理论,提出完全市场模式下的专利质押融资质押率实质上是银行与企业博弈的结果,该结果符合Stackelberg leadership model。从企业违约风险评估与银行承担风险程度两个维度,将博弈模型求解问题转化为纳什均衡求解,并运用VaR风险计量等方法,确定银行最优质押率,探索达到纳什均衡的情境。本研究将为银行专利质押融资质押率决策提供重要理论参考。
The patent pledge financing for SMEs could effectively revitalize intangible assets,ease the financial pressure for the growth of SMEs.The core risk control indicators of the patent pledge financing,that is,the loan-to-value ratios are studied.Based on the game theory,the patent pledge financing loan-to-value ratio is the result of each game between the bank and business.The results conform to the Stackelberg leadership model,according to two dimensions involving business default risk and risk tolerance of bank,a game model is constructed and it is transformed into Nash Equilibrium for solving the problem.By using VaR risk measurement and other methods,loan-to-value ratio decision under different risk tolerance is researched,and the best loan-to-value ratio decision is determined.The study will provide important theoretical reference for loan-to-value ratio decision of patent pledge finance
出处
《科研管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第12期117-125,共9页
Science Research Management
基金
中国博士后基金项目(20100471000)
"专利质押融资的基础资产筛选及期权定价模型研究"
起止时间:2010-1~2012-12
连云港市社科基金项目(11LKT01)
连云港市产学研合作与高校创新力研究
起止时间:2012-1~2012-12
连云港市软科学基金项目(RK1101)
加强产学研合作促进企业转型升级的调查与政策分析
起止时间:2011-1~2012-12
关键词
完全市场模式
专利质押融资
质押率决策模型
complete market pattern
patent pledge financing
loan-to-value ratio decision model
