摘要
分析了房地产销售的纳什博弈模型、房地产开发商作为领导者寡头博弈模型、房地产销售商作为领导者寡头博弈模型、房地产市场销售讨价还价博弈模型四种房地产市场销售博弈模型的利益分配机制和收益策略.结果表明,在房地产开发商作为领导者寡头博弈策略中,房地产销售商具有实施投机行为的动机,利益分配机制不稳定;在房地产销售商作为领导者寡头博弈策略中,房地产销售商没有实施投机行为的动机,利益分配机制的稳定;在房地产市场销售讨价还价博弈策略中,房地产销售商利益分配机制的稳定性与房地产产品的差异化替代率和无限期重复博弈策略的贴现率均有关.
The Nash game model of the real estate sales, and the Oligoly game model of the real estate developers, and the Oligoly game model of the real estate venders, and the Bargaining game model of the real estate sales are all established in this paper. The mechanism of interest distribution and strategies of income in the four kinds of game models are analyzed. The results show that, in the oligarchs game model of the real estate developers, the real estate venders possess motivation about the speculation, and the mechanism of interest distribution is unstable. In the oligarchs game model of the real estate venders, the real estate venders don＇t possess motivation about the speculation, and the mechanism of interest distribution is stable. In the bargaining game model of the real estate sales, the mechanism of interest distribution about real estate venders is related to substitution of the difference of the real estate products and discount rate of the repeated game strategy indefinitely.
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第23期45-52,共8页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
国家自然科学基金(70971064)
江苏高校哲学社会科学重大项目(2010JDXM014)
广义虚拟经济研究一般项目(GX2010-1015(Y)
GX2010-1003(Z))
关键词
房地产市场
投机行为
稳定性
real estate vendors
speculation
stability
