摘要
我国农民工市场仍然供大于求以及农民工本身所具有的先天弱势,决定了农民工在与雇主谈判时缺乏相应的"讨价还价能力",造成了农民工市场上的"寻低竞争"。在与雇主的博弈中,农民工无奈选择了突发性停工、"用脚投票"的办法。对此现象的经济学解释是"雇主与农民工讨价还价博弈模型"。
The oversupply and innate vulnerability of migrant workers in China market lead to their lack of corresponding bargaining ability in negotiations with employers, thus resulting in the phenomenon of finding work with low price in the market of migrant workers. In the game with the employer, the migrant workers have no other choices but to choose ＂an unexpected stop-work＂ and ＂ voting with their feet＂ with frustration. The explanation for this phenomenon is ＂The game model of bargaining between employers and migrant workers＂.
出处
《北京劳动保障职业学院学报》
2012年第2期6-9,共4页
Journal of Beijing Vocational College Of Labour And Social Security
