摘要
关于"Is"的"弗雷格-罗素多义性论题"一经提出,就成为分析哲学家普遍接受的共识,有些哲学史家还将其用于考察哲学史、特别是古希腊哲学史中的"to on/Being"问题。这一论题的根源可以追溯至亚里士多德,其基本思路在康德、密尔那里已然成型,而在弗雷格那里得到清晰的界定。维特根斯坦用家族相似性方法观察了"Is"的用法。海德格尔早期从生存论出发为作为"存在"的"Sein/Is"找到了新的"家"。在西学中译中,汉语缺乏西文中兼系词功能与存在用法于一身的具有屈折变化的系词,因此找不到与Being直接对应的现成译名,这未免令人遗憾。我们现在所最需要的,应该是一部比较详细的"Is"演变的概念史,以更为深入的研究"Is"的多重用法的家族相似性。
The so -called Frege -Russell ambiguity thesis of ＂Is＂ seems to be a shared view among analytical phi- losophers some of whom apply it to the history of philosophy, especially the problem of ＂to on＂ in Greek philoso- phy. The origin of this thesis dates back to Aristotle, Kant and Mill. Frege defined the thesis clearly and decisively. Later Wittgenstein made a clear view through the conception of family resemblance. Early Heidegger found the new home for ＂Sein＂ in his ontology. In Chinese there is no counterpart of the English word ＂Is＂ and similar inflective verbs of other Western languages which serve both as the copulative verb and as that signifying existence, so it＇ s difficult for us to translate the word ＂Being＂ into Chinese without losing some of its connotations. What we need now is a detailed history of the evolution of the meaning of ＂Is＂ so as to study more deeply the family resemblance of its complicated usages.
出处
《科学技术哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第6期6-11,共6页
Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology
基金
霍英东教育基金会第十一届青年教师基金优选资助课题(111106)
