摘要
对由一个风险中性制造商和一个具有风险规避特性的销售商组成的两阶闭环供应链,使用loss-averse模型测度销售商的风险规避特性,构建了考虑政府补贴因素的loss-averse闭环供应链模型,设计了收益共享契约和批量折扣契约,实现了loss-averse闭环供应链的协调,并给出了契约参数的取值范围和变化规律,同时从制定成本和实施成本两个方面对契约进行了比较。通过算例研究和对基于收益共享契约的loss-averse闭环供应链协调模型的灵敏度分析,验证了该模型的有效性及实用性。
By considering government subsidy,a two-echelon closed loop supply chain with a risk-neutral supplier and a loss-averse retailer is established.The revenue sharing contract and quantity discount contract are designed,and hence the loss-averse closed loop supply chain can achieve coordination.Also,the bound and rule of the contract parameters are given.Moreover,the two contracts are compared from the aspect of design and implement cost.Finally,by the study of an example and the sensitivity analysis of loss-averse closed-loop supply chain coordination model based on revenue sharing contract,the effectiveness and the practical value of model is verified.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第5期50-54,60,共6页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71102093)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(12YJAZH114)
山东省社会科学规划研究基金资助项目(11CGLZ07)
山东理工大学人文社会科学发展基金资助项目(2010ZDXM07)
山东理工大学博士科研启动经费基金资助项目(2011KQ08)
关键词
闭环供应链
契约协调
博弈论
风险规避
灵敏度分析
closed-loop supply chain
contract coordination
game theory
loss-averse
sensitivity analysis
