摘要
以"公地悲剧"为切入点,以西藏牧民放牧决策为研究对象,通过博弈论分析方法,研究西藏牧民在草地资源利用中的行为策略选择。结果表明:总是背叛策略集体稳定,完全友好策略也不可取;而以能够实施报复行为的一报还一报策略具有明显优势。未来收益对西藏牧民总收益的重要程度对现在行为选择有着重要关系。若贴现因子足够大,牧民间合作将是长期稳定的;若贴现因子较小,背叛将是所有策略中的最优策略,"公地悲剧"难以避免。最后根据博弈分析,提出了西藏草地资源保护中牧民行为策略的相关政策建议。
Using ＂Tragedy of the commons＂ as a reference point,the utilization of grassland resources was studied through by a game theory analysis method.Results show that defective strategy makes a collective stable and completely friendly tactics was not desirable.Retaliation strategy had obvious advantages.Future earnings play a significant role in present behavior choices.If the discount factor were large enough,mutual cooperation between herdsmen had a long-term stability.If the discount factor were minor,the betrayal strategy was an optimal strategy of all policies.The ＂tragedy of the commons＂ was impossible to avoid.Finally,a corresponding constructive policy of herders＇ behavior strategy in Tibet grassland resources protection was suggested based on the game analysis method.
出处
《草地学报》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第5期805-811,共7页
Acta Agrestia Sinica
基金
科技部"十二五"农村领域国家科技计划课题(2011BAD17B05)
农业部公益性行业科研专项(20090360)资助
关键词
西藏草地资源
生态保护
牧民行为
策略研究
Tibet grassland resources
Ecological conservation
Herdsmen＇s behavior
Strategy research
