摘要
本文以全流通背景下2009年中国制造业上市公司为样本,从实际控制人性质、第一层次所有权与控制权分离度、第二层次所有权与控制权分离度,以及金字塔层级角度,对实际控制人侵占上市公司资源的隧道行为进行实证检验。研究表明,控制权与所有权第一和第二层次的分离度越高,实际控制人越倾向于实施侵占上市公司资源的隧道行为;第一层次分离度对国有和民营性质的实际控制人隧道行为的影响大致相同,但第二层次分离度对民营性质的实际控制人隧道行为的影响较大。此外,民营性质的实际控制人的金字塔层级越多,其侵占上市公司资源的可性能越大。基于实证检验,本文还提出了防范和监管实际控制人隧道行为的建议。
Based on the background of fully circulating the China listed companies in 2009 and having selected samples from the manufacture industry, the paper focuses on the tunneling and it＇ s effect caused by the nature of the actual controller, the first and the second separation level of owner- ship and control, the pyramid control layers of the actual controller. The research results show that incentive effect of the ownership of the actual control is existing, and reducing the separating degree of two rights can help to curb the tunneling of the actual controller invasion on the assets of listed companies, the tunneling effects of the first separating level on state-owned and private-owned listed companies are almost the same and those of the second separating level are different. In addition, the tunneling of actual control in private-owned companies depends on their pyramid control layers, more layers more tunneling. The paper also provides recommendations for preventing and regulating the tunneling behavior of actual controllers.
出处
《南京社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第9期22-29,共8页
Nanjing Journal of Social Sciences
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目“应对国际金融危机的对策研究”(08AJY029)的阶段性成果
教育部哲学社会科学创新基地“南京大学经济转型和发展研究中心”课题“对外开放与中国经济转型及发展研究”的资助
关键词
实际控制人
隧道行为
所有权与控制权分离度
金字塔层级
actual controller
tunneling
separating degree of ownership and controlling
pyra- mid control layers
