摘要
采用异步通信方式,使参与者轮流采取行动以避免空洞威胁,并结合参与者的通信代价,提出一种扩展的理性秘密分享机制。将参与者信誉效用值引入到该机制中,抑制参与者的不诚实行为。分析结果表明,该机制存在序贯均衡,并且能保证在参与者不偏离序贯均衡的情况下实现秘密分享。
An extended rational secret sharing mechanism using non-simutaneous communication channels is proposed in order to avoid empty threat when players alternately take actions. To refrain effectively the dishonest behavior, reputation utility values are introduced into the new mechanism. Analysis results indicate that there is a sequential equilibrium to guarantee that players can realize secret sharing without deviating from the sequential equilibrium.
出处
《计算机工程》
CAS
CSCD
2012年第16期153-156,共4页
Computer Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(60875039)
关键词
博弈论
空洞威胁
理性秘密分享
信誉
序贯均衡
game theory
empty threat
rational secret sharing
reputation
sequential equilibrium