摘要
协调股东与经理的利益冲突是公司治理研究的重要内容之一。在传统代理理论基础上发展起来的经理管理防御研究对解释企业现实经理人的财务行为提供了一个新的视角。在阐述经理管理防御兴起的理论基础上,有机梳理企业经理在外部控制权市场和在内部财务管理活动中的管理防御行为及其经济后果,从而指出未来中国经理管理防御问题研究的重点。
It is an important part of the study that coordination of the interest conflicts between shareholders and managers in corporate governance. The research on managerial entrenchment developed from the basis of tradi- tional agency theory provides a new perspective to explain the reality of corporate financial behavior of corporate managers. This paper describes theoretical basis of the rise of managerial entrenchment, and generalizes orderly the defensive behavior and its economic consequences which the managers respond to external takeover and internal financial activities and the research situation and the problems are analyzed. Finally, the paper points out the emphasis of the managerial entrenchment study in the future in China.
出处
《首都经济贸易大学学报》
北大核心
2012年第4期116-123,共8页
Journal of Capital University of Economics and Business
基金
国家自然科学基金项目<经济转型期我国经理管理防御与企业投资行为研究>(70872092)
陕西省高校重点学科专项资金建设项目(107-00X902)
关键词
管理防御
经济后果
私人利益
代理成本
managerial entrenchment
economic consequences
personal interests
agency costs
