摘要
基于政府控制权差异,对我国国有控股上市公司进行了分类,并据此检验了经营业绩和总经理变更的关系。结果表明:政府直接控制型公司总经理变更对业绩的敏感性显著低于政府间接控制型公司,政府间接控制型公司间不存在显著差异;继任者继任初期国有法人控制型公司业绩显著下降;无论哪类公司的总经理变更都没有对业绩产生显著促进作用。
Based on the difference of government controlling, the state holding listed companies are classifled and the relation between CEO turnover and firm performance is examined. The results indicate that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor performance in government direct holding companies is significantly lower than that in other firms, in which there is no significant difference. In addition, in the first year after CEO turnovers, the firm performance in state-owned enterprise holding companies decrease CEO turnovers do not foster performance improvement in all kinds of firms.
出处
《系统工程理论方法应用》
北大核心
2006年第5期425-435,共11页
Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications
关键词
公司绩效
总经理变更
政府控制
大股东
firm performance
CEO turnover
government controlling largest shareholder
