摘要
清晰的执法权配置是提高市场规制质量的首要条件。在我国竞争法实施过程中,频繁发生的执法权冲突现象严重影响着市场规制的质量。如何解决执法权冲突,是一个兼具理论和实践意义的课题。从程序主义视角,国务院相关部委和最高人民法院都难以从根本上解决这一冲突,只有全国人大常委会及其授权立法机构才是最合适的裁决者。从实体主义视角,构建公权力的横向配置理论才是解决执法权冲突的根本。该理论认为,执法权应当配置给能以最低的管理成本完成管理目标的主体。影响管理成本的核心要素包括规制机构的重置成本、信息获取成本、管制俘获和多元执法机构的协调成本,这些要素所组成的成本衡量体系是配置执法权的一个基本分析框架。
Explicit allocation of regulatory power is one of the most important iactors which attect market regutatlon. The conflicts of regulatory power which affect the quality of regulation emerge frequently in the process of China＇s competition law enforcement. How to settle this problem is the aim of this paper. From the perspective of proceduralist, except the NPC Standing Committee and its agents, relevant ministries and Supreme People＇ s Court are not appropriate arbiters. In the substantial doctrine, law regulatory power should allocate to the administrative agency who can complete the regulatory target at the expense of minimal transaction cost.
出处
《法律科学（西北政法大学学报）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第4期112-125,共14页
Science of Law：Journal of Northwest University of Political Science and Law
基金
教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(10YJA820055)
关键词
市场规制
执法权
冲突
配置
market regulation
law enforcement power
conflict
allocation
