摘要
本文分析了大股东控制权实现过程中对管理层股权激励的监督或冲突作用以及这种影响在不同股权性质和不同成长性公司中的不同表现。研究发现:大股东控制对管理层的作用显著影响股权激励效果;国有控股上市公司大股东对管理层的监督作用明显,随着第一大股东持股比例的增大,管理层股权激励效果增强;民营控股上市公司大股东控制权与管理层股权激励之间存在冲突,第一大股东持股比例越高,股权激励效果越差;高新技术企业大股东控制权与管理层股权激励之间存在冲突;非高新技术企业中第一大股东与管理层之间存在不明显的监督作用。本文的研究结论从股权激励的公司治理环境角度解答了我国股权激励效果不佳的困惑,为不同类型的上市公司启用管理层股权激励方案时考虑适宜的公司治理环境特别是大股东控制程度提供了经验证据。
This article attempts to study the supervision and conflict between large shareholder control and the managers' ownership incentive.The consequence shows that the conflict impacts on the managerial ownership incentive.In addition to this,the paper also contrasts the effect of large shareholder's control between state-owned and privately-owned,high-tech and non high-tech companies.The results are that monitoring exists in state-owned corporations obviously while conflict is in privately-owned companies.That means in private enterprise the more the large shareholder owns the equity,the more negative impact on the managers' equity incentive and in state-owned companies,the ownership of large shareholder has an positive effect on the managerial ownership.Compared with non high-tech enterprises,high-tech companies have conflicts between the large shareholder and managers.This suggests that the effect of managerial ownership stimulation is low when the high-tech company' ownership structure is concentrate.The consequence explains the poor effect of managers' ownership incentive in China and demonstrates that supervision especially the conflict has an effect on the ownership incentive.This reminds us we must pay attention to the large shareholder when we carry out ownership incentive mechanism.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第5期50-58,94,共9页
Accounting Research
