摘要
本文利用2002—2004年的280家民营上市公司样本检验了公司内部治理机制对家族控股股东隧道行为的影响。在区分了"资本家家族"与"企业家家族"的基础上,回归分析发现:资本家家族的隧道行为动机和强度远远高于企业家家族,企业家家族有大股东的监督倾向。资本家家族倾向于通过构建多层控制链实施隧道行为;企业家家族成员在上市公司任职有利于形成合谋挖掘隧道转移资源;控股股东以企业集团方式存在的公司遭受了更加严重的掏空;家族控制的上市公司中独立董事没有发挥有效的监督作用;总经理持股比例与隧道行为强度呈现U型关系,存在"监管激励效应"及"合谋掏空效应"。研究结果表明,越是资本家控制型的公司,家族通过关联交易剥削中小股东的可能性就越大,所以本文提出对上市公司进行分类分级监管的政策建议。
In the paper, we choose the whole body of 280 private listed companies by the end of 2004 as research subjects and distinguish Capitalists-controlled （ CFB ） from Entrepreneurs -controlled （ EFB ）. The results of regression analysis on family occupying of listed companies＇ capital show： capitalist-families incline to conduct tunnel behavior by the means of establishing multi-layer control chain; members of the entrepreneur-families working in listed company is conducive to the formation of collusion, digging tunnel and transferring resources; companies whose controlling shareholders exist in the form of enterprise groups suffer from being emptied more seriously; in family-controlled listed companies, independent directors have not played an effective supervisory role; the equity ratio of general manager and intensity of the tunneling behavior show U-shaped relationship, ＂the incentive effects of regulation＂ and ＂collusion draining effect＂ existing. We find the more the business is controlled by capitalist, the more possible tunnel behavior is to be cnducted. So we think the listed companies should be classed and supervised separately.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第6期135-144,共10页
Economic Research Journal
关键词
隧道行为
关联交易
治理结构
家族控制
控股股东
Tunneling Behavior
Affiliated Transactions
Governance Structure
Family-controlled
Manipulative Shareholder
