摘要
儒家心学的内在论表现在,它是一种以心灵为本体,通过心有"同然"的预设,以"类"概念构成论证的逻辑前提,由此来达到"以一知万"的目标。它通过一种类比性的辨识和推论,用某种有限意义上的一致主义的方式,来确证忠孝仁义之类的道德原则的普适性。儒家心学的内在论的突出表现,是把事物的"理"看作是心灵所赋予的结果,这类似于现代哲学的"意义投射"的解释。"良知"本身以及"行"被用来作为认识的准则。不过以这种类比的方式来推论道德原则的普适性,导致论证上出现一些问题,包括如何从个别性的对象中推出一般性命题、如何从他人不可显现的内心情感活动中得知其具有"恻隐之心"。使用"内在论"等西方哲学的概念来诠释儒家心学在某种意义上,有助于我们了解它的哲学形态,从而有助于反驳"中国没有哲学"的论调。判定哲学的标准不应是其叙事方式,而应以思想与教化的功能来界定哲学。
Confucian theory of mind may be interpreted as a sort of internalism. It takes mind as the original stand. By the hypothesis that everyone＇s mind has something in common, ＂same kind＂ was taken as the logical premise in their arguments. Analogy was used as the method for distinguishing of similarity or difference as well as for inference in a coherent way, in order to make sure for the universality of moral principles. ＂Li＂ （理,principles） was regarded as the result being endowed by mind, which is like the doctrine of ＂projection of meaning＂ in modern philosophy. The innate knowledge of the conscience itself and its action was established as the canon of knowledge. The article also points out some problems, generating from the attempt of ＂knowing many from one＂, in the way of arguments, which aims at gaining the universality of moral principles. Finally, the paper holds that the standard for judging what philosophy is should be the function of thinking and education. It will be benefit, by interpreting of Confucian theory of mind as a sort of internalism, for refuting the saying that ＂there was no philosophy in China＂.
出处
《学术月刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第5期47-53,共7页
Academic Monthly
基金
国家社科基金项目"‘元哲学’研究"(10BZX047)
教育部人文社科研究规划基金项目"经验与先验--知识论的基础问题研究"(09YJA720017)的阶段性成果
关键词
内在论
儒家心学
“类”概念
普适性
哲学功能
internalism, Confucian theory of mind, category conception, universality, function of phi-losophy
