摘要
在分析流域生态补偿中水源地和受水区行为选择机理的基础上,利用监督博弈模型推导出双方行为选择的临界条件。研究结果表明,在其他条件不变的情况下,流域水源地的败德行为将随水源地违约超常收益的增大、生态建设机会成本的增加和其冒险意识的增大而放纵,随违约惩罚和生态补偿额度的增大而收敛;受水区的监督行为会随受水区监督成本的增加及冒险程度的提高而强化,随违约惩罚、违约对受水区造成潜在损失的加重而弱化。
The mechanism of behavior selection of water area and water source in ecological compensation is analyzed,and the critical condition of behavior＇s election of them is obtained by using supervise game model.The research results show that the other conditions under the condition of invariable,with abnormal returns enlargement,ecological construction opportunity cost increases and its risk consciousness,water source＇s behavior becomes worse;with the amount of the punishment and ecological compensation,the increase of convergence water source＇s behavior becomes better.Water area will strengthen supervision with higher supervisory cost and risk and weaken supervision with breach penalty and potentially loss＇s aggravating.
出处
《生态经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第5期28-31,共4页
Ecological Economy
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"引入市场机制对水源地进行生态补偿的理论与管理政策研究"(70873077)
关键词
流域生态补偿
水源地
败德行为
监督博弈
watershed ecological compensation
water source
risk behavior
supervise game
